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In the 1980s the concept of “État modernе” gained more and more ground in the French 
historiography, and conventional statist concepts came in for severe criticism. The debate 
centred around not only general approaches concerning continuity of political processes 
from Antiquity to Modern times, but also around more specific issues, which, nevertheless, 
required serious reconsideration. With regard to this, the phenomenon of coup d’État and its 
interpretation in accordance with the development of État modernе is of exceptional interest. 
In the Early Modern time, there were no mechanisms of the dialogue between rulers and 
political communities. The absence of dialogue didn’t mean the absence of conflict, therefore, 
the only remaining means of resolving such conflicts was political cataclysm (including a 
coup d’état), and it was absolutely ordinary and imperative in the existing framework at the 
time. In order to outline the main features of coups d’État during the period of genesis of État 
moderne, it‘s necessary to systematize this phenomenon and to consider concrete examples of 
this classification. The most frequent form of coups d’état, and historically the first one at the 
time, was usurpation, which was quite natural — as the power was physically represented in 
the body of the sovereign. The second form of coups d’État typical of the period of the genesis 
of État modernе were extraordinary actions in the course of dynastic crises. The third form of 
coups d’état in the period of the genesis of État moderne were coups disguised as the struggle 
against conspiracy.
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После того как в 1980-х годах во французской историографии широкую популярность 
обрела концепция État modernе, традиционные этатисткие концепции были подверг-
нуты разрушительной критике. Полемика затронула не только общие подходы, касав-
шиеся преемственности политических процессов от античности до Нового времени, 
но и более частные проблемы, требовавшие, однако, серьезного переосмысления. Осо-
бый интерес в связи с этим представляют само явление государственных переворотов 
и его интерпретация с учетом логики становления État modernе. Концепт «coup d’État» 
появился в трактате Габриэля Нодэ «Considerations politiques sur les coups d’État». Он 
определял «coup» как ситуацию, в которой правитель нарушает законы ради защиты 
публичных интересов. В этом же тексте появляется концепт «raison d’État», который 
определяется как «знание или наука о нужных средствах для основания сеньории, ее 
сохранения и увеличения». Соединение в одном тексте двух элементов, актуализирую-
щих новое понимание функций и возможностей верховной власти, обусловило четкий 
разрыв между прежней и новой концепциями общественного блага. В раннее Новое 
время не существовало механизмов диалога правителей с политическим сообществом. 
Отсутствие диалога не означало отсутствия конфликтов, поэтому любой политиче-
ский катаклизм (в том числе и государственный переворот) был единственным спосо-
бом разрешения этих конфликтов, и в той системе координат он был абсолютно орди-
нарен и необходим. В статье выделяются основные характеристики «государственного 
переворота» периода генезиса État moderne и приводится их классификация. Наиболее 
частым видом государственных переворотов и исторически первым в то время была 
узурпация. Вторым видом государственных переворотов, характерных для периода ге-
незиса État modernе, были экстраординарные действия в ходе династических кризисов. 
Третьим видом государственных переворотов эпохи генезиса État moderne являются 
перевороты, замаскированные под борьбу с заговорами.
Ключевые слова: Западная Европа раннего Нового времени, новое государство, госу-
дарственные перевороты.
In the 1980s the concept of “État modernе” gained more and more ground in the 
French historiography1, and conventional statist concepts came in for severe criticism. 
The debate centred around not only general approaches concerning continuity of political 
processes from Antiquity to Modern times, but also around more specific issues, which, 
nevertheless, required serious reconsideration. With regard to this, the phenomenon of 
coup d’état and its interpretation in accordance with the development of État modernе is 
of exceptional interest2. 
1 Since then, an international group of scholars headed by Jean-Philippe Genet has been engaged in 
researching the genesis of the concept of l’État modernе. See: Genèse de l’État Moderne. Prélèvement et 
Redistribution / éd par. J.-P. Genet, M. Le Mené. Paris, 1987; État et Église dans la Genèse de l’État Moderne 
/ éd par J.-P. Genet, B. Vincent. Madrid, 1986; La Ville, la Bourgeoisie et la Genèse de l’État Moderne XIIe — 
XVIIIe siècles:  actes du colloque de Bielefeld, 29  novembre  — 1er décembre 1985  /  éd. par J.-P. Genet, 
N. Bulst. Paris, 1988; L’État Moderne: Genèse, bilans et perspectives / éd. par J.-P. Genet. Paris, 1990; L’État 
moderne: le droit, l’espace et les formes de l’État / éd. par J.-P. Genet et N. Coulet. Paris, 1990; Visions sur 
le développement des États Européens. Théories et historiographies de l’État Moderne / éd. par J.-P. Genet, 
W. Blockmans. Rome, 1993; L’État Moderne et les Élites, XIIIe  — XVIIIe siècles. Apports et limites de 
la méthode Prosopographique / éd. par J.-P. Genet, G. Lottes. Paris, 1996; Genet J.-P. La Genèse de l’État 
moderne Culture et société politique en Angleterre. Paris, 2003; Rome et l’État moderne européen / éd. par 
J.-P. Genet, Rome, 2007.
2 The colloquium devoted to the phenomenon coup d`état was held in Madrid, in November, 25–27, 
2002. Its materials were published: Coups d’État à la fin du Moyen Âge? Aux fondements du pouvoir politique 
en Europe occidentale / sous la dir. de F. Foronda, J.-P. Genet, J. M. Nieto Soria. Colloque international (25–
27 novembre 2002) Madrid, 2005 (Collection de la Casa de Velázquez. Vol. 91).
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It is known that the concept of coup d’état emerged in 1639 in the treatise by Gabriel 
Naudé “Considerations politiques sur les coups d’Etat”, in which a ruler violates norms and 
regulations for the sake of public interests. In the same text, besides coup d’état, the concept 
of “raison d’état” appeared, which is defined as “knowledge or science about the necessary 
means for establishing the seigneury, its preservation and expansion”3. The combination 
of two elements, which emphasized new understanding of the functions and possibilities 
of supreme power, in the same text brought about an appreciable breach between old and 
new concepts of commonwealth, and inevitable contradictions.
Traditional statist concept was criticized from two perspectives. On the one hand, it 
had become evident that the state of the 19th century, absolute monarchies of the 15–18th 
cc., feudal monarchies of the Middle Ages and ancient Roman Empire occupied phys-
ically different space. Thus, modern man encounters with the state on a daily basis: by 
paying taxes, interacting with public officers, using state property, receiving information 
about the state from the mass media. The subjects of the Early Modern monarchy encoun-
tered the supreme power or its attributes far less frequently, whereas the people inhabit-
ing Western Europe in the time from Antiquity to late Middle Ages might not have seen 
representatives of the emperors and kings throughout their entire life. Recognizing the 
continuity between forms of political structures in European society, over the course of, at 
least, three thousand years, French scholars suggested that a separate period be identified 
which they entitled “new state” (état modernе). État modernе was formed as a result of the 
transformation of the feudal state in the 13–18th centuries, and since then has been char-
acterized by a number of distinct features differentiating État modernе from the previous 
political constructs. 
On the other hand, there was essential criticism leveled at terminological analysis. 
In most European languages the word “state” is derived from Latin “status”. This Latin 
term has been long used to describe power relations (for example, General States and 
Pays d’états), however, in its modern sense (as the structure of supreme power relations 
in the human community, i.e. “the state”) it emerged in the texts of the end of the 15 — 
beginning of the 16th century, with “The Prince” by Machiavelli being its most prominent 
example. Prior to it, such terms as “regnum” (“kingdom” or “realm”), “imperium” (“em-
pire”), “civitas” (“polis”) had been used. These terms often coexisted within the same text 
(for instance, in “The Defender of Peace” by Marsilius of Padua), and until the middle 
of the 20th century researches and translators had treated them as full synonyms4. Later, 
the falsehood of this approach became more evident. Neither “regnum”, nor “imperium”, 
“civitas” or even “res publica” had the same scope of meaning as the modern concept of 
“status”, and mere replacing them with “state” engendered serious notional distortions. 
Machiavelli’s usage of the word “status” (Italian “stato”) was not accidental and 
stemmed from his own experience: he witnessed the formation of political entities in 
Northern Italy (named “city-states”, nowadays obsolete), whose structure was entirely 
3 Definition of coup  d’état  : “excessus juris communis propter bonum commune”, in other words, 
“courageous and extraordinary actions, which Sovereigns are forced to take in complex and often desperate 
situations, against common law, not conforming to any order or jurisdiction, which poses risk to the private 
for the sake of the public”. — Naudé G. Considerations politiques sur les coups d’Etat. [S. l.], 1723. Р. 77.
4 It was reflected in the English translation of the treatise “The Defender of Peace” by Marsilius of 
Padua made by A. Gewirth. The translator almost everywhere rendered Latin “regnum” and “civitas” with 
the English word “state”. See: Marsilius of Padua. Defensor pacis / transl. and intr. by A. Gewirth. New York, 
2001.
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new, and old “political vocabulary”5 was not sufficient to describe them. Presuming that 
the emergence of phenomena precedes the emergence of concepts, it was concluded that 
by at least the end of the 15th century there had existed états modernеs in the north of the 
Apennine peninsula. Surprisingly rapid spread of the term “status” in other political texts 
from different European regions over the course of the next two centuries attests that the 
new concept found fertile ground as medieval structures of power were dying out with the 
terminology suitable for their description, yielding to “État modernе”.
Having proven the necessity and usefulness of the concept of “État modernе” and 
having established the difference between this political phenomenon and preceding struc-
tures of powers, historians addressed the issue of its genesis. État modernе originated in 
the feudal society in the process of its sophistication which led to the emergence and dif-
ferentiation of two spheres: the sphere of law and political sphere6. External conditions for 
both processes (or, perhaps, external manifestations) were, first of all, increasingly active 
interest in Roman Law in the 12–13th centuries, and the development of civil, canon and 
common laws on its basis in accordance with the demands of the contemporary society; 
secondly, reception of political Aristotelianism, translation of his main works from Latin 
(in particular, “Politics” and “The Nicomachean Ethics”) and application of his terminol-
ogy and framework of categories to description of relations of power. Before that time, the 
power of one person over another (i.e. worldly, secular power) was not deemed worthy of 
philosophical reflection. There had been fragmentary contemplations, without a specially 
formed discourse. 
In retrospect, it is possible to point out the following understandings of “pre-statist” 
concepts of power in Western Europe during the Middle Ages7. First and foremost, it is 
the theological concept of divine origin of earthly power connected with the name of 
Augustine and his work “The City of God”. The next concept in the order of importance 
is the feudal concept of power, according to which, sovereign plays the role of supreme 
seigneur, whereas his relationships with the subjects take the form of contract agreement. 
The third concept associates supreme power with the military leader, while the sovereign 
is the defender and commander. Finally, it is necessary to mention the concept of kinship 
(patriarchal concept), in accordance with which the ruling dynasty is perceived as the 
oldest clan within the system of clans, with its ruler being the eldest clansman within his 
family. It should be noted that “pre-statist” concepts of power were not simplistic or inef-
fective: they had coexisted and functioned for more than seven centuries (since the period 
of late Roman Empire up to the 15th century), and their impact is still felt in political 
reflections. All four “pre-statist” concepts left room for the possibility of serious changes 
(including forcible ones) in the structure of power relations. According to Augustine, “bad 
ruler” is the “scourge of the Lord” imposed on people for their sins, however, from the 
perspective of the ruler, tyranny is, obviously, a sin, blatant violation of Christian precepts. 
Therefore, tyranny fighters could expect theological justification of their actions. As far as 
5 Boucheron P. Théories et pratiques du coup d’État dans l’Italie princière du Quattrocento // Coups 
d’État à la fin du Moyen Âge? Aux fondements du pouvoir politique en Europe occidentale. Madrid, 2005. 
P. 25. 
6 Genet J.-P. Le Coup d`État, ou les légitimités contrariées? // Coups d’État à la fin du Moyen Âge? Aux 
fondements du pouvoir politique en Europe occidentale. Madrid, 2005. P. 13.
7 Ladero Quesada M. A. Golpes de Estado a fines de la Edad Media? Fundamentos del poder político 
en la Europa occidental // Coups d’État à la fin du Moyen Âge? Aux fondements du pouvoir politique en 
Europe occidentale. Madrid, 2005. P. 598.
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feudal concept is concerned, tyranny is the breach of contract drawn up with the vassals, 
and the right to a just rebellion against an autocratic senior was taken for granted for a 
long time. Within the framework of the military concept, a “bad ruler” is ineffective com-
mander who is unable to maintain discipline in his army. In accordance with the kinship 
concept, a ruler who violates family traditions is bad. In this case, those who bring him 
down appeal to an older relative. If there was no such living relative, then they appealed to 
the memory of the dead ancestors. Since the 13–14th century the figure of “bad ruler” had 
started to be perceived within legal and political categories, and it was this perspective 
that survived in the epoch of “État moderne”8. From a legal viewpoint, tyranny is a crime. 
Tyranny fighters had to find legal norms which the ruler, who they intended to depose, 
had violated. Politically, tyranny is ineffective realization of power. Therefore, success in 
the actions against power structures politically justified the actions. Legal and political 
definitions of “tyranny” formed the basis for implementing coups d’état.
In addition to the new concept of “bad ruling” during the epoch of État moderne, 
the power structure itself had undergone changes, new subjects of power relations had 
emerged — the ruler and his subjects. All the subjects comprised “political community” 
(universitas civium or res publica)9. Within the new context, the ruler (sovereign) had lost 
theological features, and his essence had been desacralized. Aristotelian political theory, 
or, rather, its reconsideration suggested by Western European intellectuals of the 13–16th 
centuries, apparently contributed to it. The treatise «The Defender of Peace” by Marsilius 
of Padua was indicative in this respect. According to it, the ruler is “the main part” (pars 
principans) of civil corporation (universitas civium) and is subject to “the human legisla-
tor” (legislator humanus)10, who is the same as civil corporation, thereby, in other words, 
it is the entirety of all citizens11.
The period of the genesis of État moderne was the epoch of disappearance of old 
power structures, the time of crisis. The former ties had died out before the new ones 
strengthened. Under new circumstances, rulers became vulnerable and had to come up 
with new methods of defense of their power. These methods can also be divided into two 
groups: political and legal. Political strategy of the rulers during the emergence of État 
modernе involved incorporating noblemen into political sphere, with its depersonifica-
tion at the same time. As the significance of feudal contracts was diminishing, the sacred 
status of sovereigns was disappearing, their military and dynastical authority was under-
going changes, the nobility deemed themselves less and less bound by the duties before 
the supreme power.
In the actual fact, it was the aristocracy who possessed real power resources: so-
cio-economic (land tenure), legal (seigneurial court) and military (local nobility clien-
telism). It was quite frequent in the history of Western Europe that coalitions of noblemen 
against the royal power were formed, and civil wars became a common feature. France in 
16–17th centuries can exemplify it with its protracted Religious wars caused by the crisis of 
8 Nieto Soria J. M. Rex inutilis y tiranía en el debate político de la Castilla bajomedieval // Coups d’État 
à la fin du Moyen Âge? Aux fondements du pouvoir politique en Europe occidentale. Madrid, 2005. P. 88.
9 Ladero Quesada M. A. Golpes de Estado… P. 599–600.
10 Marsilius de Padua. Defensor pacis // Monumentis Germaniae Historicis, Fontes iuris germanici 
antique. Hannover, 1933. I. XV. 2.
11 Ibid. I. XII. 3.
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the outdated system of relationships between the monarchy and aristocracy12. The strat-
egy of the French monarchy can be succinctly described in the following way: during the 
first stage loyal noblemen, retaining all their existing privileges, were encouraged to carry 
out royal service, whereas disloyal aristocracy was physically destroyed whenever possi-
ble; during the second stage representatives of nobility were awarded state positions and 
generous economic compensations, while their military and legal authority was reduced; 
during the third stage hereditary nobility was actively weakened as titles were given to 
people from lower social strata (leading to a sort of inflation of titles), while bureaucracy 
had finally been separated from aristocracy. Political strategy of defending the power of 
sovereign in other Western European countries was similar.
As far as legal defense was concerned, it involved establishing the corpus of legal 
norms securing royal power and dynasty, i.e., ensuring its legitimacy. The legitimacy of 
modern state is based on its national sovereignty. This abstract legal concept exists owing 
to the regular political dialogue between power institutions and society. In democratic 
states, this dialogue can be held by two means — ordinary and extraordinary. An ordinary 
mechanism is realized through elections, an extraordinary one — through referendum. 
Thus, a coup d’état is something unacceptable, outside the bounds of law, as in theory 
when the ruling elite, or even the constitution, ceases to meet the demands of the society, 
there are legal ways of changing them13. It should be noted that this structure is based on 
the legitimacy of the state, which, in its turn, is founded on national sovereignty. National 
sovereignty took its final shape in Europe only after First World War during the imple-
mentation of Versailles system in the form of The League of Nations. In some cases, it is 
possible to claim, although with essential caveats in mind, that a number of European 
states (France, Germany, the Russian Empire, Italy (to a certain event) looked upon na-
tional sovereignty as a cornerstone of their legitimacy in the 19th century and even in the 
second half of the 18th century, but no earlier than that. Prior to that, since the emergence 
of État modernе its legitimacy had been based on a complex combination of old “legit-
imacies” of supreme royal power (sacred, military, dynastic, feudal), in addition to new 
political and legal “legitimacies”, which could be expressed in one phrase: “good ruling” 
realized in accordance with “law”.
In the Early Modern time, there were no mechanisms of the dialogue between rulers 
and political communities. The absence of dialogue didn’t mean the absence of conflict, 
therefore, the only remaining means of resolving such conflicts was political cataclysm 
(including a coup d’état)  , and it was absolutely ordinary and imperative in the existing 
framework at the time14.
In order to outline the main features of coups d’état during the period of genesis of 
État moderne, it‘s necessary to systematize this phenomenon and to consider concrete 
examples of this classification. The most frequent form of coups d’état, and historically the 
first one at the time, was usurpation, which was quite natural — as the power was physi-
cally represented in the body of the sovereign. 
12 Constant J.-M. Limites des Études Descriptives et Qualitatives Clans Partis Nobiliaires et Politiques 
au Temps des Guerres de Religion //  Genèse de l’état moderne: prélèvement et redistribution: actes du 
Colloque de Fontevraud, 1984. Paris, 1987. P. 175–185.
13 Ladero Quesada M. A. Golpes de Estado… P. 597.
14 Genet J.-P.  Le Coup… P. 14.
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Usurpation was imminent when the sovereign was unable to establish an effective 
dialogue with his subjects. Usurpation per se was not legitimate, so the concept of trea-
son had been developed in the course of the centuries to secure the sovereign. However, 
it was possible to legitimize usurpation afterwards. Strategically, to resist such forms of 
coups d’état it was necessary to make the center of power more sophisticated so that taking 
control over the body of the ruler by itself was not a sufficient prerequisite for the success 
of the attempt of usurping power15. Such usurpations can be exemplified by a series of 
overthrowing of English kings in 14–15th centuries. In 1327 Edward II was removed from 
power and afterwards killed by the order of his spouse Isabella and her lover Roger Mor-
timer. His removal in favour of his son Edward III was approved by the Parliament. More-
over, in 1330, Mortimer was executed. The dynasty had not been discontinued; the Par-
liament legitimized “cruel” actions against lawful ruler — it was a classic form of usurping 
power. 
In 1399, Henry Bolingbroke, Duke of Lancaster, son of John of Gaunt and grandson 
of Edward III overthrew Richard II and became King Henry IV. The events of 1327 in-
spired him as a model, setting a sort of precedent. However, the situation in that case was 
somewhat different: although Richard II was childless, he had a no less legitimate heir — 
Edmund Mortimer (great-grandson of Edward III via female lineage, whose grandmother 
was the daughter of Duke of Clarence). For Bolingbroke’s supporters, the task was to 
transform usurpation into a legal dynastic change causing the creation of a myth about 
Richard’s willing abdication in favour of Henry. Contemporary public perception of this 
event was ambiguous, especially in comparison with the perception of usurpation in 1327. 
In this regard, the son of Henry IV — Henry V, upon ascending the throne, was compelled 
to transfer the body of the murdered Richard II to Westminster, thus making this action 
manifest that he was a lawful heir of the unfortunate monarch.
Despite the popularity of Henry V, Duke of York in 1461, his long distance cousin, de-
posed his son Henry VI. Dukes of Yorks descended from the fourth son of Edward III via 
male lineage (Edmund of Langley), and Duke of Clarence via — female lineage. Therefore, 
they had dynastic rights to claim the English throne, but the situation in 1461was funda-
mentally different from 1399 as Henry VI had a son Edward. Furthermore, deposition of 
Henry VI was not approved by the Parliament, and the city assembly of London (“people 
of London”) proclaimed Duke of York King.
These examples enable to trace the evolution of the phenomenon of usurpation. In 
all these cases there were two aspects: political (deposition was put down to “bad ruling”) 
and dynastic, which, in essence, was legal (debates about the order of seniority among cer-
tain branches of the dynasty). While dynastic aspect prevailed in 1327, as Edward III was 
the son and legitimate heir of Edward II, in the usurpation of 1461, when the Yorks’ claims 
to the throne were very doubtful, it was political aspect that came to the fore. 
The policy of the Tudors was the outcome of the series of usurpations in 14–15th cen-
turies, which was brought about by the fear of the continuation of the Wars of the Roses 
(starting after the events of 1461): the Tudors made their center of power more sophisti-
cated to prevent or complicate attempts at usurpation16.
15 Watts J. Usurpation in England. A Paradox of State-Growth // Coups d’État à la fin du Moyen Âge? 
Aux fondements du pouvoir politique en Europe occidentale. Madrid, 2005. P. 115–130.
16 Ibid. P. 126.
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The second form of coups d’état typical of the period of the genesis of État modernе 
were extraordinary actions in the course of dynastic crises. They can be illustrated by the 
process of solving the issues of royal inheritance in Castile after the death of Her Catholic 
Majesty Isabel17.
In 1504, according to the will of Isabel, her daughter Joanna became Queen. Since 
Joanna suffered from a mental illness, she could be only a nominal monarch, so her father, 
Ferdinand, King of Aragon, was appointed her regent. However, at the time Joanna was 
married to Philip from the House of Habsburg. Castilian Cortes regarded Ferdinand’s 
regency as a threat to their independence, so they proclaimed Philip regent in 1506, but 
shortly afterwards he died leaving an heir  — minor Carlos. Thus, the struggle for the 
regency between Ferdinand of Aragon and the father of Philip, Emperor Maximilian, en-
sued. Due to the complexity of the military circumstances in Italy, Maximilian was forced 
to waive his claims, and in 1509, a treaty of Blois was concluded, according to which 
Ferdinand became regent for Joanna, and in the case of her death — for Carlos until his 
25th birthday. This treaty was acknowledged by Castilian Cortes. In 1516, Ferdinand died, 
and Castile was deprived of a legally capable ruler, which brought about a political crisis. 
Carlos was an “heir to the throne”, i.e. the figure without any real power, whereas there 
was no elder relative left who might become regent for insane Joanna. Cardinal Cisner-
os took charge of the kingdom, making Carlos King within a short period. He initiated 
negotiations with the Roman Curia, as a result of which, in 1517, Pope Leo X issued the 
bull “Pacificus et aeternus Rex” where Carlos was named “Hispaniarum rex” (“Spanish 
king” without division into Castile, Aragon and Navarre) and “Rex catolicus” (“Catholic 
Majesty”). Both titles were reserved for Carlos, his prospective spouse and their heirs, 
while Joanna was mentioned as “Queen of Castile”. Having obtained the sanction from 
the Church, Cisneros summoned Cortes of Castile. In 1518, after Cardinal’s death Cortes 
swore allegiance to Carlos as King of Castile and Catholic Majesty (“Rex catolicus”) in 
Valladolid. The ideological myth, in accordance to which Carlos inherited the title “Rex 
catolicus” and kingdoms of Castile, Aragon and Navarre directly from his grandfather 
and grandmother, leaving out his mother, was created. Resolving this dynastic crisis by 
extraordinary means, albeit without any violence, was a coup d’état, i.e. illegitimate seizure 
(transfer) of power, with its subsequent legitimation. 
The third form of coups d’état in the period of the genesis of État moderne were coups 
disguised as the struggle against conspiracy. A bright example of this form were events oc-
curred after the assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza in 147618. The Duke of Milan was 
stabbed on the 26th of December by a group of conspirators during mass in the church of 
Santo Stefano. His murderers were immediately caught and executed. They were young 
patricians dissatisfied with the despotic power of Galeazzo Maria. However, his energetic 
son not only managed to retain the father’s power, but also created a new political envi-
ronment where there was no room for the ancient nobility of Milan. A similar example 
can be found in the history of Florence after the unsuccessful Pazzi conspiracy19. In April, 
26, 1478, members of the Pazzi family and their allies attempted to assassinate Lorenzo 
and Giuliano de’ Medici. As in Milan, the plotters aimed at preserving their former social 
role and authority, preventing “mutazione di stato” which undermined their social might. 
17 Ladero Quesada M. A. Golpes de Estado… P. 595–606.
18 Boucheron P. Théories… P. 29.
19 Ibid. P. 30–33.
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There was a certain ritual logic behind the conspiracy: public attempt at the body of the 
sovereign (personal vengeance) and secret seizure of the Signoria (political act). Despite 
the death of Giuliano, the failure of the Pazzi gave free rein to Lorenzo, who succeeded in 
completing the process of establishing autocratic power of the Medici in Florence, which 
had been initiated a few decades before by his grandfather Cosimo. 
Coups d’état of this type were instrumental not only in setting up the regime of per-
sonal power: on the contrary, Venetian oligarchy eradicated the remains of monarchical 
competences of the Doges in the 14th century by creating the Council of Ten — an extraor-
dinary tribunal, whose functions involved control over the supreme Magistrates of Venice 
in order to prevent their usurping of full power, rather than political control over the 
population. It should be noted that the Council of Ten came into being after conspiracies 
organized by Tiepolo-Querini (1310) and Marino Faliero (1355), which had been brought 
about by the gradual process of the Great Council Lockout at the end of the XIII century 
(from that moment on, the membership was available only to a limited number of fami-
lies, whereas others were excluded from real political activity). All of the above-mentioned 
conspiracies were not regarded as coups d’état, however, the mere fact of the existence of 
the Council of Ten had been deemed a “permanent coup d’état” in the historiography until 
the end of the 18th century20. 
In the examples of coups d’état of the third type listed above, conspirators turned out 
to be true defenders of the “state”, they tried to prevent far-reaching political consequenc-
es, while their failures signified victory of so-called “creeping coups d’état” on the part of 
the rulers. 
Based on the classification described in the paper, it is possible to define key attri-
butes of “coups d’état”:
•	 Inseparable connection with law and politics — legitimation of new “good ruling” 
•	 Violence was often part of coups d’état, but not necessarily its sine qua non.
•	 The aim and the outcome of a coup d’état — taking control of the entire political 
structure (hence assassinations of sovereigns and their literal, physical “capture”).
•	 Sovereigns themselves acted as protagonists in some coups d’état.
•	 Coup d’état — is not necessarily an instantaneous or short-term event: it can last 
for quite a long time. 
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